Federal Tax Liens In Bankruptcy by unknown
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 23 | Issue 2 Article 13
Fall 9-1-1966
Federal Tax Liens In Bankruptcy
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons, and the Tax Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Federal Tax Liens In Bankruptcy, 23 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 370 (1966),
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol23/iss2/13
370 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIII
between a union and an employer providing for mandatory retirement
with a pension be construed as not providing for pension payments
while the employer is also liable for unemployment compensation. Of
course an employer could probably provide effectively for this as a
term of the employment contract.
Yet another solution would be a judicial ruling, whether or not
pursuant to a statute, which would allow substitution of benefits
already being received by the employee in lieu of payment of
unemployment compensation. Possible substitutions are the pension and
either the half of the social security paid by employers for the em-
ployee's benefits or the entire amount of social security receivable by
the employee. The problem of the waiver section of the applicable
unemployment compensation statute would have to be solved and
might, as in Marcum, be accomplished by holding that the employee
has no right to unemployment compensation.
The foregoing propositions are not ultimate answers; they are, how-
ever, an attempt to balance the equities of the situation and are
submitted as a guide for jurisdictions considering the problem. But
an answer should be sought, preferably by the legislatures, which
would allow employers and the employees to know in advance how
the provisions of employment contracts providing for manda-
tory retirement with a pension for a retiring employee will be
construed. With such prior knowledge, employers could protect them-
selves from a double financial burden, and employees would know how
their retirement would affect the assumed right to apply for unem-
ployment compensation when there is inability to find immediate em-
ployment after mandatory retirement.
JAMES F. DouTHAT
FEDERAL TAX LIENS IN BANKRUPTCY
An important policy of the Bankruptcy Act is to achieve pro rata
distribution among all creditors of the bankrupt.' The general order
of distribution of the bankrupt estate is:
I. Secured claims.2 Claims of creditors who have security for their
debts upon property of the bankrupt.3
'See 3 Collier, Bankruptcy S 64.02, at 2058 (14th ed. 1964) [hereafter cited as
Collier].
2The right of a secured creditor is technically a property right rather than a
claim against the bankrupt estate. MacLachlan, Bankruptcy § 150 (1956) [here-
after cited as MacLachlani.
3Bankruptcy Act § 1 (28), 52 Stat. 840 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 2 (28) (1964).
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II. The General Bankrupt Estate.
A. Unsecured priority claims. Claims given priority by the
Bankruptcy Act.
4
These in order of priority are:
1. General expenses of administering the bankrupt estate.
2. Wages and commissions of employees of the bankrupt
earned within 3 months before bankruptcy not to exceed
$600 per claimant.
3. Expenses of creditors incurred in the successful opposition
to a discharge or in adducing evidence resulting in the
conviction of any person of a bankruptcy offense.
4. Unsecured federal, state, and local tax claims.
5. Debts owing to any person including the United States,
entitled to priority under any federal statute and rent within
certain limitations entitled to priority under applicable state
law.
B. Unsecured general claims. Dividends to general unsecured
creditors0 [Bracketed numerals and letters used hereafter refer to this
outline.]
The Internal Revenue Code provides that the federal government
acquires a lien for taxes on all property of any taxpayer liable for
such taxes when it makes a demand for payment and the taxpayer
neglects or refuses to pay." There is no practical way to discover
the existence of this secret lien, but to alleviate some of its harshness
Congress has provided in § 6323 of the Internal Revenue Code that
the lien is not valid against a "mortgagee, pledgee, puichaser, or
judgment creditor" until notice of the lien is recorded.7
4§ 64a, 52 Stat. 874 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 104a (1964); See Mac-
Lachlan §5 150-55.
51Bankruptcy Act § 65a, 52 Stat. 875 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 105a (1964). See Mac-
Lachlan §§ 301-02.
8 If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same
after demand, the amount (including any interest, additional amount, addition
to tax, or assessable penalty, together with any costs that may accrue in
addition thereto) shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all
property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to
such person. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6321.
7"[Tlhe lien imposed by section 6321 shall not be valid as against any mortgagee,
pledgee, purchaser, or judgment creditor until notice thereof has been filed by
the Secretary or his delegate. . . ." Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323 (a). Notice must
be filed in the office designated by the law of the state or territory in which
the property subject to the lien is situated. When the state or territory has
not designated such an office, notice is filed with the clerk of the United States
19661
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If the federal government acquires a tax lien by demand and refusal
before: a taxpayer goes into bankruptcy, the tax claim will ordinarily8
be paid as a secured claim [I] ahead of the claims of both priority
[II A] and general unsecured creditors [II B], even though the lien
is not recorded,9 unless the trustee in bankruptcy can be made to fall
within one of the 4 classes-mortgagees, pledgees, purchasers, or judg-
ment. creditors-against whom the tax lien must be recorded to be
valid.
The "strong arm clause" of the Bankruptcy Act, which is a part
of § 70c, provides:
The trustee, as to all property, whether or not coming into pos-
session or control of the court, upon which a creditor of the
bankrupt could have obtained a lien by legal or equitable pro-
ceedings at the date of bankruptcy, shall be deemed vested as of
such date with all the rights, remedies, and powers of a creditor
then holding a lien thereon by such proceedings, whether or not
such a creditor actually exists.' 0
This section has consistently been interpreted to give the trustee in
bankruptcy all the powers of a "judgment creditor" to avoid liens
when a judgment creditor would, under applicable state law, have
better rights than such lienholder. 11 For example, the trustee is able
to defeat the lien of a mortgagee who failed to record his mortgage
before bankruptcy; the mortgagee then takes as a general unsecured
creditor [II B] rather than as a secured claimant [I]. 12
The Courts of Appeals for the 2d, 3d, and 9th Circuits have not,
however, held that the "strong-arm clause" vests the trustee with the
District Court in which the property is situated. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, S
6323(a) (1)-(2).
8Under certain circumstances the tax lien will not be paid until after pay-
ment of. administration expenses and wages-the first two unsecured priority
claims [II A 1, 21. See text accompanying note 55, infra.2See, e.g., cases cited at note 13, infra.
1052 Star. 879 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110c (1964) [Emphasis added.]
"See, 'e.g., In re Sayre Manor, Inc., 120 F. Supp. 215 (D.N.J. 1954) (Un-
recorded land purchase contracts void under New Jersey law against subsequent
judgment creditors without notice void as to trustee); McKay v. Trusco Finance
Co., 198 F.2d 431, 433 (5th Cir. 1952) (Unrecorded conditional sales contract
void as to judgment creditor with lien under Alabama law void as to trustee);
Sampbell v. Straub, 194 F.2d 228, 231 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
927 (1952) (Unrecorded homestead exemption void as to judgment lienholders
under California law void as to trustee).
12E.g, Hams. v. Marshall, 43 F.2d 703, 704 (2d Cir.) cert. denied 282 U.S. 882
(1930), (decided under bankruptcy Act § 47a, 30 Star. 557 (1898), the predecessor
to present § 70c). See 4 Collier § 70.55.
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rights of a "judgment creditor" insofar as protection from the un-
recorded federal tax lien is concerned.' 3 These decisions were based
on the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Gilbert Associates14
involving a municipal tax assessment that the New Hampshire Su-
preme Court had held was "in the nature of a judgment."' 15 Gilbert
sustained the validity of the unrecorded federal tax lien against the
municipal tax claim, holding that a "judgment creditor," for purposes
of defining the class protected from the unrecorded tax lien, is a
creditor holding a judgment "in the usual, conventional sense of a
judgment of a court of record." 16 Gilbert stressed the necessity for
a uniform interpretation of federal statutes and the confusion which
would result from permitting state courts to make different interpre-
tations of the phrase "judgment creditor."
When the 6th Circuit held that the "strong-arm clause" does give
the trustee the rights of a judgment creditor as against the unrecorded
federal tax lien,' 7 the Supreme Court granted certiorari' 8 to resolve
the resulting inter-Circuit conflict and affirmed in United States v.
Speers,'9 thus settling the most common question involving the tax
lien in bankruptcy proceedings.20 In Speers, the federal government
acquired a lien for more than $14,000 in withholding taxes and inter-
est on the property of the Kurtz Roofing Co. 17 days before
bankruptcy. The lien arose by demand and refusal and was not re-
corded before bankruptcy. Sale of the assets of the Kurtz Roofing
Co. after expenses of sale produced approximately $14,000.21 The
trustee successfully contended that "judgment creditors" are protected
from the unrecorded federal tax lien by the Internal Revenue Code,
and that under the "strong-arm clause" of the Bankruptcy Act the
13Simonson v. Granquist, 287 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1961), rev'd on other grounds,
369 U.S. 38 (1962); in re Fidelity Tube Corp., 278 F.2d 776 (3d Cir.), cert. denied
sub nor. Borough of East Newark v. United States, 364 U.S. 828 (1960);
Brust v. Sturr, 237 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1956).
14345 U.S. 361 (1953) (decided under Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 3672, the
predecessor of § 6323).
15Petition of Gilbert Associates, Inc., 97 N. H. 411, 414, 90 A.2d 499, 502 (1952).
'0 United States v. Gilbert Associates, supra note 14, at 364. A judgment
creditor must also have a llen to be protected by § 6323 of the Int. Rev. Code,
Miller v. Bank of America, 166 F.2d 415, 417 (9th Cir. 1948) (decided under
Int. Rev. Code of 1939 § 3672, the predecessor of § 6323).
171n re Kurtz Roofing Co., 335 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1964). See note, 1965 Duke
L.J. 142; 53 Geo. L.J. 813 (1965).
'sUnited States v. Speers, 379 U.S. 958 (1965).
19382 US. 266 (Black dissenting).
20See Levit, United States v. Speers-A Milestone, 71 Com. L.J. 70 (1966).
21Notice of final meeting of creditors of Kurtz Roofing Co., No. 27743,
(D. C. N. D. Ohio, V. Div., March 5, 1962).
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trustee is deemed a "judgment creditor." Under the trustee's pro-
proposed plan of distribution, affirmed by Speers, the federal govern-
ment received less than $9,000 of the approximately $14,000 realized
from sale of the bankrupt's property;22 the Government's claim was
reduced to the less favored status of a 4th priority unsecured tax
claim [II A 4] sharing pro-rata with state and local taxes.
Speers permits for the first time an artificial judgment creditor, the
bankruptcy trustee, to prevail against an unrecorded federal tax lien.
The uniformity problem in Gilbert (the possibility of confusion re-
sulting from permitting state courts to make different interpretations
of the phrase "judgment creditor") is not present in Speers since
interpretation of the Bankruptcy Act is a federal matter.2 3
Speers felt that Congress intended to confer "judgment creditor"
status on the trustee in bankruptcy. The predecessor of the "strong-
arm clause" was enacted in 1910 and read in part:
Such trustees, as to all property in the custody or coming into
the custody of the bankruptcy court, shall be deemed vested
with all the rights, remedies, and powers of a creditor holding a
lien by equitable or legal proceedings thereon; and also, as to all
property not in the custody of the bankruptcy court, shall be
deemed vested with all the rights, remedies, and powers of a
judgment creditor holding an execution duly returned unsatis-
fied.24
Prior to this amendment, the Bankruptcy Act provided that the
trustee was to be vested with the title of the bankrupt to all property
"which might have been levied upon and sold under judicial process
against... [the bankrupt] ." 25 However, in 1906 the Supreme Court
in York Mfg. Co. v. Cassel26 had refused, despite the existing lan-
22The federal government actually received only about $1800 since costs of
the appeal to the Supreme Court had to be paid as an administration expense
[II A 11 before payment of its tax claim [II A 41. Notice of Final Meeting
of creditors of Kurtz Roofing Co., No. 27743, (D. C. N. D. Ohio, W. Div.,
Feb. 7, 1966).
23The application of Gilbert as a basis for holding that the trustee was not to
be deemed a judgment creditor in order to prevail against the unrecorded
federal tax lien met with much disapproval. See, e.g., 4 Collier § 70.49 n.3c,
at 1415; MacLachlan § 183, at 192; Loiseaux, Federal Tax Liens in Bankruptcy,
15 Vand. L. Rev. 137, 138-42 (1961); Seligson, Creditors Rights, 32 N.Y.Ul..
Rev. 708-11 (1957).
24Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 412, 36 Stat. 838, 840 (Emphasis added.)
25Bankruptcy Act, § 70a (5), 30 Stat. 565 (1898) (now as amended, 66 Stat.
429 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (5) (1964).
26201 U.S. 344 (1906). See 4 Collier § 70.47, at 1396; MacLachlan § 183,
at 187.
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guage of the Act, to give the trustee title to property in the possessiori
of the bankrupt as a vendee under an unrecorded conditional sale
contract. In Cassell, the Court found that under the controlling Ohio
conditional sales law only creditors with liens could avoid an un-
recorded conditional sale and that the conditional sale contract was
still good between the parties even though not recorded. Since the
trustee took the same title to property that the bankrupt had, the
trustee simply stood in the shoes of the bankrupt in such circum-
stances and could not be given the benefit of the Ohio recording act.
The 1910 amendment, therefore, expanded the trustee's powers to
reach those cases where state law protected creditors with unrecorded
liens. 27
The only substantial amendment"8 to the "strong-arm clause,"
adopted in 1950,20 clearly simplified the definition of the status of the
trustee.30 The distinction between property coming into the custody
of the bankruptcy court and property not coming into the custody
of the bankruptcy court was eliminated, and the clause conferring
the "rights, remedies, and powers of a judgment creditor then hold-
ing an execution returned unsatisfied" was deleted. Instead, the trustee
was given the rights of a creditor who "could have obtained a lien
by legal or equitable proceedings" as to all property of the bankrupt
whether or not such property comes into the custody of the bank-
ruptcy court. Since the rights of a creditor holding a lien by legal
or equitable proceedings are ordinarily greater than those of a judg-
ment creditor holding an execution returned unsatisfied,31 the elim-
ination of the distinction as to possession by the 1950 amendment:
clearly put the trustee in the stronger of the 2 positions which
had existed under the original enactment of the "strong-arm clause." 32
A creditor with a lien through legal or equitable proceedings does
not necessarily have a judgment. For example, a creditor may acquire
a lien by attachment prior to judgment.33 A "judgment creditor"
does not necessarily have a lien; in some jurisdictions a judgment does
not become a lien until properly docketed.34 It has generally been
27See 4 Collier § 70.47, at 1388-91.
28Other amendments occurred in 1938, ch. 575, § 1, 52 Star. 879, and 1952,
ch. 579, § 23, 66 Stat. 420.
29Act of March 18, 1950, ch. 70, § 2, 64 Stat. 25.
DOSee 4 Collier § 70.47, at 1393.
S1See 4 Collier 70.47 n.18, at 1393; MacLachlan, § 70c of the Bankruptcy Act,
24 Ref. J. 107 (1950).
3 2See MacLachlan § 183, at 192.
33See 4 Collier § 70.49, at 1412, n3a at 1413.
34See 4 Collier § 67.08 and cases cited in n.7 at 96-97.
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held, however, that the "strong-arm clause" gives the trustee the
rights of a judgment creditor as against imperfect liens other than
the unrecorded federal tax lien.3 5 For example, the trustee's rights
are better than those of a mortgagee who has failed to record his
mortgage.36 Speers said that the purpose of the 1950 amendment was
to broaden rather than reduce the powers of the trustee37 since "else-
where in the same legislation it was recognized that the category of
those holding judicial liens includes judgment creditors3 8 and a judicial
lienholder generally has 'greater rights than a judgment creditor.' "9
Originally the federal tax lien statute did not protect any subsequent
creditors from the secret tax lien.40 In 1893 the Supreme Court held4'
that the tax lien was valid against a bona fide purchaser for value,
but to alleviate the harshness of this holding, Congress provided in
1913 that the federal tax lien would not be valid against a "mortgagee,
purchaser, or judgment creditor" until the lien had been recorded.
42
Pledgees were added in 1939 to the classes protected.43 During the
period in which the term "judgment creditor" appeared in both the
"strong-arm clause" of the Bankruptcy Act and the tax lien sections
of the Internal Revenue Code, the 2d Circuit in 1949 said in dictum in
United States v. Sands44 that the trustee in bankruptcy was to be
deemed a "judgment creditor" for purposes of avoiding the unrecorded
tax lien.4 After the 1950 deletion of the term "judgment creditor" from
the "strong-arm clause," and after the Gilbert holding that a judgment
creditor for purpose of protection from the unrecorded federal tax
35See 4 Collier S 70.49, at 1412-13.
S6See e.g., Hams v. Marshall, supra note 12.
37H.R. Rep. No. 1293, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1949); See 4 Collier § 70.47, at
1393.38Act of March 18, 1950, ch. 70, 64 Stat. 24, 25 (1950), 11 U.S.C. § 96a(4).
See 4 Collier § 70.49, n.3, at 1415; MacLachlan S 183, at 192 (1957); Loiseaux,
supra note 23, at 139.
39United States v. Speers supra note 19, at 273, quoting H.R. Rep. No. 745,
86th Cong., 1st Sess, to accompany H.R. 7242, p. 10. See Loiseaux, supra note
23, at 139.
4ORev. Stat., § 318b (1875), as amended, ch. 125, 20 Stat. 327, 331 (1879).41United States v. Snyder, 149 U.S. 210 (1893).
42Act of March 4, 1913, ch. 166, 37 Stat. 1016.
431nr. Rev. Code of 1939, § 401, ch. 247, 53 Stat. 862, 882.
44174 F.2d 384, 385 (2d Cir. 1949).
45Speers said that the 2d Circuit was "the only Court of Appeals [in Sands,
supra note 44,] squarely to pass upon the question." United States v. Speers,
supra note 19, at 272 (Emphasis added.) Although Sands unequivocably stated
that the trustee in bankruptcy had the rights of a judgment creditor as against the
unrecorded federal tax lien, since the collector had taken possession of the
property before bankruptcy the court upheld the Government's unrecorded
lien on the ground that it was a statutory lien by distraint.
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lien meant a creditor with a judgment of a court of record, -I Con-
gressional effort was made expressly to exclude from the Internal
Revenue Code "artificial" judgment creditors such as the trustee in
bankruptcy from the classes protected against the unrecorded federal
tax lien.46 The Senate, however, deemed it "advisable to continue to
rely upon judicial interpretation of existing law." 47 Speers felt that
this existing law sought to be preserved was not Gilbert but the dictum
in Sands, and cases holding that the trustee in bankruptcy was to have
the rights which a judgment creditor would have under state law.48 Al-
though Gilbert held that for purposes of avoiding the unrecorded
federal tax lien a judgment creditor must be a creditor with a judg-
ment of a court of record, at the time the legislation was proposed,
"Gilbert had not yet been applied by any court to displace the rights
of the trustee in bankruptcy as against an unrecorded federal tax
lien.: 49
Speers also found that after the view began to spread that Gilbert
compelled exclusion of the trustee in bankruptcy from the protection
given judgment creditors against the unrecorded federal tax lien, legis-
lation had been introduced "expressly to reiterate the trustee's power
to upset unrecorded federal tax liens." 50 The proposed legislation5l
on 1 occasion passed both Houses of Congress but was vetoed by
President Eisenhower. 52 Speers based its holding in part upon such
"expressions of congressional discontent with recent decisions" deny-
ing the trustee the protection given judgment creditors against un-
recorded tax liens. 3
Speers indicates that under an opposite result-upholding of the
validity of the unrecorded federal tax lien against the trustee-the
Government would have received "the full amount owing to it." 54
Even if this result had been reached, § 67c of the Bankruptcy Act 55
43H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., to accompany H.R. 8300, p.
A407; 1954 U. S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4554.
47S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., to accompany H.R. 8300, p. 575;
1954 U. S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5224; H. Conf. Rep. No. 2543, 83d Cong. 2d
Sess., to accompany H.R. 8300, p. 78.
48E.g., MacKay v. Trusco Finance Co., SampseU v. Straub; supra note 11.
49United States v. Speers, supra note 19, at 274.
SOlbid.
51H. R. 7242, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., § 6; H. R. 394, 88th Cong. 2d Sess., § 6;
H. R. 136, 89th Cong, 1st Sess., § 6.
52H.R. 7242, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., § 6, vetoed 'by President on Sept. 8, 1960,
106 Cong. Rec. 19168.
OaUnited States v. Speers, supra note 19, at 275.
541d. at 269.
5566 Star. 427 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 107(c) (1964).
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provides that payment of statutory liens, including liens for taxes
owing to the United States, may be postponed until payment of the
first two priority claims, administration expenses and wages up to
$600 [II A 1, 21. This provision is applicable only if:
(1) The bankrupt estate is insolvent.
(2) The lien is on personal property.56
(3) The lien is not accompanied by possession.
(4) The lien has not been enforced by sale prior to the filing of
the petition in bankruptcy.
Although these requirements limit the instances to which the statutory
lien postponement provisions of § 67c are applicable, the federal tax
lien can under the proper circumstances be subordinated to the ad-
ministration expense and wage priorities. This possibility existed be-
:fore Speers.57 Thus, in those cases where the trustee could already
have applied the statutory lien postponement provision, the only
benefit to unsecured creditors is to enhance the positions of the
priority class 3 creditors [II A 3] and state and local tax claims
[II A 4] to the extent the Government's position is made less favor-
able. The unrecorded federal tax lien still has priority over the claims
of unsecured general creditors [II B].
The Government contended in its brief that to allow the trustee to
invalidate the unrecorded federal tax lien would result in a "windfall"
to secured creditors who are not mortgagees, pledgees, purchasers, or
judgment creditors whose security was obtained subsequent to the
unrecorded tax lien. 58 Under this contention, creditors who are not
already protected by the recordation requirement of § 6323 of the
Internal Revenue Code but whose liens are nevertheless valid in bank-
ruptcy as secured claims [I], advance monetarily by the amount of
the invalidated tax claim. To illustrate: Assume that before bank-
ruptcy the Government acquires, but fails to record, a tax lien for
$10,000 and that subsequent to the tax lien but still before bank-
ruptcy a creditor files, but does not reduce to judgment, a valid"9
attachment lien which will be paid as a secured claim [I] in bank-
ruptcy. Assume that sale of the property produces no more than
56"Personal property" has been interpreted to mean tangible personal property.
United States v. Eiland, 223 F.2d 118, 123 (4th Cir. 1955).
67See 4 Collier S 67.27.5 8Brief for Petitioner, United States v. Speers, supra note 19.
59To be valid the attachment must not be followed by bankruptcy within
4 months of its acquisition if at the time the lien was obtained the debtor was
insolvent. Bankruptcy Act § 67a, 52 Stat. 875 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 107(a) (1964).
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$10,000. Unless the trustee can avoid the unrecorded tax lien, the
Government takes the entire amount, because as against the federal
tax lien the attachment lien is "inchoate" until judgment and there-
fore does not make the attachment holder a judgment creditor.60 But,
if the federal tax lien is invalid against the trustee for failure to record
and thereby reduced from a secured claim [I] to an unsecured tax
claim [II A 4], the attachment lien will be the first secured claim to
be paid, thus producing an obvious windfall for the attaching creditor.
Speers accepted this contention without argument:
It is true that the consequence of depriving the United States of
claimed priority for its secret lien is to improve the relative po-
sitions of creditors-if there are any not already protected by
§ 6323-whose security was obtained subsequent to the Govern-
ment's lien and who, once the federal lien is invalidated, have a
prior claim to the secured assets.61
Such windfalls to junior lienors could be avoided if the trustees
could assert the Government's invalidated rights for himself and ob-
tain the amount the Government would have obtained had the fed-
eral tax lien been recorded for the benefit of the general estate [II].
Other sections of the Bankruptcy Act which enable the trustee to
avoid or postpone certain transfers and security interests expressly
provide for subrogation of the trustee to the invalidated interest, re-
sulting in a larger distribution to the general estate [II]. § 67c, deal-
ing with postponement of statutory liens, not only allows the trustee
to postpone statutory liens, including federal tax liens, on personal
property not in the lienholder's possession until payment of the admin-
istration and wage expense priorities; it also permits the trustees to
step into the shoes of the creditor whose statutory lien has been post-
poned for the benefit of the general bankrupt estate.62 But, although
Speers enables the trustee to avoid the unrecorded tax lien, it does not
appear that he is in a position to use any preservation provision such
as that contained in § 67c or other sections of the Bankruptcy Act
to preserve the lien for the benefit of the general bankrupt estate and
I0 United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950) (attachment
lien inchoate until judgment, tax lien attaching prior to judgment entitled to
priority). The "choate lien doctrine" requires that an antecedent lien must
be specific and perfected to prevail against the government's lien. Choateness is
always a matter of federal law. See Kennedy, The Relative Priority of the
Federal Government: The Pernicious Career of the Inchoate and General Lien,
63 YAL LJ. 905 (1954).
0 lUnited States v. Speers, supra note 19, at 275-76.
0266 Stat. 427 (1952), 11 US.C. § 107(c) (1964).
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prevent windfalls to competing lienholders. § 6063 is the voidable pref-
erence section of the Bankruptcy Act. When a creditor of the bank-
rupt, having reasonable cause to believe the bankrupt insolvent,
would receive a greater percentage of his debt than creditors of the
same class, the trustee may avoid transfers made within 4 months
before bankruptcy by the bankrupt debtor to such creditor-transferee.
A transfer within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act" includes
securing an involuntary as well as voluntary lien.65 A tax lien is an
involuntary lien. § 60 further provides that where the preference is
voidable, the court may
order such lien or title to be preserved for the benefit of the gen-
eral bankrupt estate, in which event such lien or title shall pass to
the trustee.
If these requirements are met, § 60 would apply to tax liens as invol-
untary transfers6 6 were it not for § 67b which provides for a sweeping
validation of statutory liens even though arising while the debtor
is insolvent and within 4 months before bankruptcy.67 § 67b allows
statutory liens, including liens for federal taxes, to be perfected after
bankruptcy if perfected within the time allowed by the applicable
federal or state law creating or recognizing the lien. 8 As Speers
pointed out:
§ 67, sub. b permits an otherwise inchoate federal tax claim to be
"perfected" by assessment and demand within the four months
prior to bankruptcy or afterwards. It does not nullify or purport
to nullify the consequences which flow from the Government's
failure to file its perfected lien prior to the date when the trus-
tee's rights as a statutory judgment creditor attach-namely, on
filing of the petition in bankruptcy.69
Although it would now seem superfluous to be able to perfect the
tax lien after bankruptcy since it must also be recorded to be valid
against the trustee,70 § 67b would always permit the lien to be per-
6364 Stat. 24 (1950), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1964).
64Bankruptcy Act § 1 (30), 30 Star. 544 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 1 (30)
(1964).
653 Collier § 60.07, 60.09 (14th ed. 1964).
663 Collier § 60.12.
6766 Star. 427 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 107(b) (1964).
68See 4 Collier § 67.20 at 183.
69United States v. Speers, supra note 19, at 278.
7OThe "strong-arm clause" may in other instances render impossible the
perfection of statutory liens after bankruptcy under § 67b. See Oglebay, Some
Developments in Bankruptcy Law, 24 Ref. J. 63 (1950).
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fected within the 4 months before bankruptcy thus taking it out of
the § 60 voidable preference category.
§67a 7l is another section that must be analyzed in connection with
preventing windfalls to competing lienholders when the unrecorded
federal tax lien is invalidated. It provides for invalidation of judicial
liens and also contains an avoidance and preservation provision. Under
§ 67a every lien obtained by attachment, judgment, levy, "or other
legal or equitable process or proceedings" within 4 months before
filing of a petition in bankruptcy shall be void if the debtor was
insolvent at the time the lien was obtained, and the bankruptcy
court may order any such lien to be preserved for the trustee for the
benefit of the general bankrupt estate. However, a federal tax lien
is a statutory lien rather than a lien obtained by "legal or equitable
process or proceedings," § 67a is therefore inapplicable.72
§ 70e 73 provides that any transfer or obligation incurred by the
bankrupt estate which is voidable under non-bankruptcy law by any
creditor having a claim provable in bankruptcy shall be void against
the trustee, and that the trustee may preserve such transfer or obli-
gation for the benefit of the general bankrupt estate. But, to apply
§ 70e, it must be shown that at least 1 of the present creditors of
the estate holding a provable claim was a creditor as against whom the
transfer was fraudulent or voidable under the controlling state or
federal law.
74
Although it appears no existing provision of the Bankruptcy Act
can be used to preserve the invalidated tax lien for the trustee for
the benefit of the general bankrupt estate [II] to prevent windfalls to
competing lienholders,75 the same result might be achieved by refer-
ence to the priorities contemplated by the Internal Revenue Code.
It can be argued that the trustee's rights against the unrecorded federal
tax lien in no way affect the federal government's rights against other
lienholders against whom the unrecorded federal tax lien is valid. The
Internal Revenue Code provides that to be valid against a "mortgagee,
7152 Stat. 874 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 107(a) (1964).
72"[Lliens created by statute to protect particular classes of persons are
governed in bankruptcy by sub-divisions b and c of § 67, whatever the mode
of perfection or enforcement." 4 Collier 67.12 [1] n.2a, at 120. See e.g., Davis
v. City of New York, 119 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1941) (city sales tax lien arising
on docketing of a warrant in county clerk's office held statutory lien within
67b rather than lien obtained by legal proceedings).
7352 Stat. 882 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110(e) (1964).
744 Collier § 70.90, at 1729.
75See Comment, Avoiding Federal Tax Liens in Bankruptcy, 39 Texas L. Rev.
616 (1961); Note, 35 Ind. L.J. 351, 353-57 (1960).
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pledgee, purchaser, or judgment creditor" the federal tax lien must
be recorded; if the lien is not recorded, a judgment creditor such as
the trustee in bankruptcy has greater rights to the taxpayer's property
than the Government. The Internal Revenue Code does not provide,
however, that the existence of a judgment creditor will increase the
rights of any other lienholder against whom the unrecorded tax lien
is still valid. Rather, after the amount of the judgment creditor's lien
has been paid, any balance remaining should be applied to the tax
lien and then to the lien which is junior to the federal tax lien. Since
the "strong-arm clause" of the Bankruptcy Act gives the trustee the
power of a judgment creditor as to all property of the bankrupt
taxpayer, as a practical matter there will never be anything left for
a lienholder junior to the tax lien after the trustee has defeated the
unrecorded tax lien. Thus, such junior lienholders who would receive
windfalls under the assumption in Speers could only take as general
creditors [II].
The Speers holding will never benefit more than a few claims, pri-
marily unsecured state and local tax claims which, even then, will only
share pro-rata with the federal tax claim. Third priority creditors'
fraud expenses [II A 3] will also benefit, but such claims are rare.78
Except in cases involving real property, administration expenses and
wages [II A 1 & 2], the first 2 priorities, would by virtue of § 67c
(the statutory lien postponement section) be paid before the federal
tax lien anyway unless the Government takes possession of the prop-
erty before bankruptcy,77 the bankrupt estate is solvent, or the Gov-
ernment enforces its lien by sale prior to bankruptcy.78 Furthermore,
if the Court is correct in assuming the elevation of liens ordinarily
behind the tax lien, the result is a windfall to junior lienholders simply
because of the intervention of bankruptcy. It is obvious that this re-
sult is not contemplated by the Bankruptcy Act79 inasmuch as all
other sections permitting the trustee to invalidate liens and transfers
provide that the trustee can preserve and assert the rights of the
claimant whose interest has been invalidated for the benefit of the
general bankrupt estate [111.80
7oSee Note, 39 Ref. J. 55, 56, n.21 (1965).
77See Goggin v. Division of Labor Law Enforcement, 336 U.S. 118 (1949).
78See text accompanying note 54, supra.
79See Seligson, Recent Developments in the Field of Federal Tax Claims, 29
Ref. J. 7, 11 (1955).
SOBankruptcy Act § 60, 64 Star. 24 (1950), as amended, 11 U.S.C. S 96
(preferences) (1964); § 67a, 52 Stat. 875 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. S 107(a)
(1964) (judicial liens); § 67c, 66 Stat. 427 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 107(c) (1964)
(postponement of statutory liens); § 67d, 66 Stat. 428 (1952), 11 U.S.C. S 107(d)
CASE COMMENTS
The Speers holding does, however, conform to the general policy
of the strong-arm clause and the entire Bankruptcy Act in giving the
trustee broader control over the bankrupt's assets at the date of bank-
ruptcy than would a holding that an unrecorded federal tax lien is
valid in bankruptcy as a secured claim [I].81
While the Bankruptcy Act attempts to make distributions to the
bankrupts' creditors as fair as possible, it also seeks to enable the
bankrupt debtor to return to economic and social productiveness by
discharging him from claims of his old creditors.82 Even though the
amount the Government receives is altered by Speers, the bankrupt
taxpayer is still liable for the excess amount not realized in bank-
ruptcy, since no tax claim is dischargeable.83 If avoidance of the
unrecorded federal tax lien results in larger payments to junior lien-
holders and priority creditors, then to the extent of such payments
the bankrupt is left with a greater amount of nondischargeable tax
indebtedness.
The policy of insuring the collection of the Government's revenues
is strong8 as evidenced by the existence of the secret tax lien and the
strict judicial definition of the classes against whom the unrecorded
lien is invalid under § 6323 of the Internal Revenue Code.85 Since
allowing the trustee to invalidate the unrecorded tax lien primarily
benefits unsecured state and local tax claims and, presumably, junior
liens not protected by § 6323 of the Internal Revenue Code, as a
result of Speers the policy of protecting the federal revenue is altered
somewhat by the advent of bankruptcy. Speers permits a result in
bankruptcy which nonbankruptcy cases such as Gilbert refused to
reach.86 While the unrecorded federal tax lien defeated the local
assessment in Gilbert, Speers allowed the local tax to share pro-rata
(1964) (fraudulent transfers); § 70e, 52 Stat. 882 (1938), as amended, 11
U.S.C. § 110(e) (1964) (transfers voidable by any creditor of the bankrupt
voidable by trustee).
81See 4 Collier S 70.45, at 1384.
8 2See MacLachlan 5 100.
83Bankruptcy Act § 17 (9) (1), 30 Star. 544 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § 35 (9) (1)
(1964).
84The purpose of the secret tax lien is to insure prompt and certain collection
of taxes. See United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 51 (1950);
United States v. Bond, 279 F.2d 837, 847 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
895 (1960); "The Court today gives frail and inadequate support, I think, for
its judicial destruction of the Government's congressionally created lien." United
States v. Speers, supra note 19, at 280 (Black dissenting).85See United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 53 (1950)
(concurring opinion); Walker, What Protection Against the Secret Federal Tax
Lien? 9 J. Taxation 8 (1958).
8OUnited States v. Gilbert Associates, 345 U.S. 361 (1953).
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